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ABSTRACT 
ALEX MARTIN: Women Empowerment Externalities of the 2004 Moroccan Moudawana 
Reform: Intrafamily Bargaining and Educational Attainment 
In order to evaluate the potential human capital externalities of women empowerment and 
more equitable Moudawana (personal status law) policies in the North Africa region, I use 2 
countries as case studies, each with different Moudawana regimes. I compare Morocco, which 
had a significant Moudawana reform in 2004, to Egypt, whose Moudawana is far more 
inequitable. Using difference-in-difference analysis on survey data, I compare educational 
attainment in Morocco and Egypt. I support this with descriptive statistics about women 
empowerment in Morocco. The results suggest that the Moudawana reform may increase women 
empowerment and lead to increased educational attainment. 
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Preface: In the fall of 2015, I spent a semester studying in Meknes, Morocco, where I shared an 
apartment with five other American students. Our program hired a housekeeper, Nora*, to cook 
most of our meals and do some cleaning. She was from a small village in the mountains and 
spoke a unique Arabic dialect, so we communicated in small spurts. Our conversations mostly 
involved me parsing her sentences, asking her to explain the words I did not understand, 
inevitably leading to more sentences and more questions. Given the language barrier and her shy 
temperament, I began to learn a few details about her life after a month of such communication. 
Some stuck out to me- that she had left her husband, who she said was cruel to her daughter, and 
now lived alone with her daughter, working this job to afford her daughter’s private schooling.  
Looking back on this experience, I find it remarkable that she was able to leave her 
husband; it is even more remarkable that she was able to live alone, making her own decisions 
about her employment and her daughter. These decisions, which seem commonplace to 
Westerners, were only completely afforded to Nora and women like her in the Moroccan 
Moudawana (family law or personal code) reforms of 2004. Because of this experience and other 
similar experiences during the semester I spent studying in Morocco, I developed an interest in 
the interaction between laws and opportunities as well as the economic externalities that varying 
degrees of opportunity and agency can have on a country’s population. 
 
1. Introduction 
I am broadly interested in how changes in policy, even when working against cultural or 
religious norms, can have an impact on the empowerment of women.  In order to investigate the 
potential importance of laws and policies that provide equitable opportunity and agency 
structures to all citizens, I analyze educational attainment during the period of 2003-2010 in two 
similar countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, Morocco and Egypt. 
Using a difference-in-differences test, I examine the changes in women empowerment resulting 
from the 2004 Moroccan Moudawana reform. I find that the reform of the Moudawana is 
statistically significant in explaining an increase in educational attainment for both men and 
women.  I also provide evidence suggesting that this reform has positively affected the relative 
bargaining power of women in the household. I will also discuss other potential explanations for 
the increase in educational attainment and remaining roadblocks to enforcement of the 
Moudawana. 
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I will be using Arabic language terms such as moudawana and shar’iah. While they are 
not names, due to conventions of the Arabic language them may be capitalized or not capitalized. 
If these terms stand for a specific thing, such as the Moroccan Moudawana, they will be 
capitalized; if referred to generally, they will not. Any italics of Arabic terms are not my own.  
I also made efforts to use my Arabic and French language skills. The surveys that I used 
were in French and Arabic. The Moudawana policies themselves that I discuss were originally 
written in Arabic. This required an extensive amount of translation.  
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Effect of Policy on Gender Equity 
Empowerment is both the process and the outcome of enhancing the structure of 
opportunity and enhancing the capacity for agency of a population or population sub-group 
(Narayan 2005). The opportunity structure, here, is the ability of an individual or a group to 
make choices on their own behalf, and the capacity for agency is the ability of this individual or 
group to enact their choices to bring about desired outcomes. Together, these concepts form the 
degree of empowerment experienced by a person or group. This is a relatively new concept in 
the discussion about economic development, e.g., it has only been recognized by the World Bank 
as a development goal and tool for poverty reduction since 2001 (Kabeer 1999; World Bank 
2001). Many recent studies show a link between empowerment and long-term development 
outcomes, indicating that empowerment is not only important to ensure equity for all members of 
society, but also to better enable society as a whole to grow and develop economically and 
societally, as I discuss in Section 2.2 (World Bank 2001). Unequal empowerment means that a 
society’s policies, laws, and norms give some individuals or groups better access, power, or 
opportunities than others (Smith 1989).  
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   In 1973, Ester Boserup published a book titled Woman’s Role in Economic 
Development, which is widely regarded as a “pioneering effort” to examine the part of women in 
economic development (Beneria and G. Sen 1981, p. 279). Not only did she find that women had 
often been ignored in past development analyses and proposed policy reforms, but she also found 
that many well intended policies could actually be harmful to women (Boserup 1970; Boserup 
1973).  Since then, an extensive literature has developed on the impact of policy on gender 
equity and the importance of “gender mainstreaming.”  
There is significant literature supporting the idea that policy can increase gender equality 
and empower women (Korpi et al., 2013). In many Western countries, researchers, originating 
with Hernes in 1987, have determined that social policies aimed at reducing gender inequality 
through a reduction in the gender employment gap have been effective to some extent (Hernes 
1987; Hobson 1990; Crompton 2006). There is empirical evidence to support that policies that 
increase the gender equity of access to economic assets are linked with a productivity increase 
for female producers (Goldstein and Udry 2008). A recent 2014 paper by Mariaflavia Harari 
about the restructuring of Kenyan inheritance rights, upon which I model my empirical analysis, 
supports the idea that increased property rights for women can increase women empowerment 
and thus positively impact a variety of health and educational outcomes (Harari 2014). I will 
further discuss the link between policies that promote gender equity and other societal outcomes 
in Section 2.3. 
Conversely, many policies aimed at increasing gender equality can often have 
unintended, negative consequences. Many studies show that these policies can hurt women by, 
for example, failing to “challenge the gender division of household labor,” creating stronger 
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Mandel and Semyonov 2005). Even seemingly innocuous policies such as tax codes can have 
adverse gender equity impacts by, for example, penalizing part-time work or a second household 
income (True  2003). As discussed in a 2002 United Nations Development Report, this is a 
particular salient issue in the MENA region (UNDP 2002). 
In the Arab world specifically, personal status laws have often been a source of 
discrimination against women. As I will discuss later, restrictive personal status laws are often 
associated with conservative and/or fundamentalist governments (Charrad 2011). These personal 
status codes do legally limit a woman’s influence in the family, often legally requiring a woman 
to obey her husband or another male guardian. Also, they can, for example, limit the number of 
women in the labor force. In the Middle East, a reduction of the presence of women in the labor 
force has been linked with “profound social consequences” including “higher fertility rates, less 
education for girls, and less influence within the family” (Ross 2008, p.1). On the other hand, 
Tunisia overhauled its Moudawana in 1956 post-colonization, making a number of reforms 
aimed at gender equity, such as a minimum marriage age and a guarantee of equal wages 
between genders. In return, the country has seen a variety of health, labor, and educational 
benefits for society stemming from these freedoms given to women (Watts 2007).  
Given these benefits and risks, most NGOS and governments alike now practice “gender 
mainstreaming,” the idea that gender should be considered in all policies, reforms, and activities 
(Anderson 1993). However, it is necessary to continue to evaluate policy through this lens. The 
degree of empowerment can be measured quantitatively and analyzed by comparing many 
indicators of women empowerment, such as school enrollment, educational attainment, literacy, 
health, life expectancy fertility, skill endowments, etc. (Diener & Fujita 1995; Alsop & Heinsohn 
2005).  While one or more of these indicators might be affected initially while the rest remain 
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stagnant, an overall increase in the above variables would support an increase in women 
empowerment, but there is not a perfect association between these variables (Mueke 1992; 
Kabeer 1999; Narayan 2005). Although these are inexact relationships, these variables are often 
highly correlated. Therefore, increases in three or more would suggest an increase in women 
empowerment, while an increase in only one or two might not be enough to confirm such a 
relationship. 
2.2. Gender Equity and Economic Growth 
Gender empowerment and gender equity are not only important in their own right. There 
is extensive evidence to support that gender empowerment and increased gender equity can drive 
or increase economic growth and development. There are two main theoretical pathways that 
could explain the relationship between women empowerment and economic growth and 
development. One is the structuralist school, which says that incentive structures, such as 
education laws, voting laws, or even societal norms, must be reformed to promote women 
empowerment. Reductions in gender inequality following from these reforms would likely help 
to promote economic growth.   Alternatively, modernization theory says that increases in 
economic growth will eventually bring about societal modernization and greater resource wealth, 
which would in turn promote women empowerment via mechanisms such as greater 
democratization. These theoretical pathways differ largely in the direction of proposed causality.  
The structuralist approach necessitates reforms that restructure incentives to encourage 
equitable treatment for all. The previously mentioned “gender mainstreaming” is part of this 
approach (Molyneux 2007). The  primary avenues through which economic growth and 
development are affected by women empowerment are physical and human capital investments 
as well as the fair functioning of markets and economic institutions (World Bank 2001). Reforms 
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in these areas, economic growth aside, have been shown to improve opportunities for women, 
increase access to schooling for children (girls in particular), improve health outcomes for 
women and children, and enhance women empowerment in general (IMF 2000; World Bank 
2001).  Examples of reforms include allowing women to have more free time throughout the day 
by improving infrastructure or allowing women to hold land titles, houses, or other productive 
assets that can increase their level of productivity (Jejeebhoy 1995). Positive empowerment and 
economic growth outcomes directly linked to such reforms show that a society need not wait for 
the possibility that modernization and democratization would eventually lead to more equitable 
practices (Dollar & Gatti 1999). 
Lipset first observed that economic development is related to democracy (Lipset 1959). 
The subsequent body of research founded what is known as modernization theory, which 
explains how democracy and development can be correlated (Prezworski and Lmogni 1997). In 
modernization theory, there are three main processes: socioeconomic development, value 
change, and democratization (Weber 1958; Rostow 1961; Barro 2000; Inglehart & Welzel 2003). 
Debates continue as to how exactly these processes are related, and there is still a critical lack of 
a completely integrated theory of modernization and social change (Dahl 1998; Inglehart & 
Welzel 2003). Some researchers believe that socio-economic development causes the rise of 
“modern” values, such as gender equity and democracy, but still others (like structuralists) 
believe that these values, when enacted, can enable socio-economic development (Inkeles & 
Smith 1974; Putnam 1993; Landes 1998 Inglehart & Baker 2000). Amartya Sen’s 2001 book 
“Development as Freedom” was praised for its depiction of how greater access to rights and 
resources enrich and empower many marginalized people. However, it lacked an investigation 
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into mechanisms that might actually allow these goods to reach and affect said people (Evans 
2002). 
While modernization theory shows how democracy is connected to economic 
development, studies such as Boserup’s 1970 study on cash crops and revenue flow shows that 
an increase in resources or wealth does not always mean that these benefits are passed on to all 
people. Democracy can affect women empowerment, if enough of the population supports 
structural reforms that make the distribution of and access to key resources and decision-making 
abilities more equitable. Thus, while modernization theory might show how structural reforms 
could come about, it seems necessary that these reforms take place for women empowerment to 
meaningfully increase.  
Leading development authorities such as the World Bank support structural reform as 
part of the best practices of economic development work (World Bank 2001). Many recent 
empirical cross-country studies find that increased gender equity in education and in the market 
sphere has a significant, positive effect on labor productivity and thus on economic growth 
(Knowles et al. 2003). Additionally, similar studies find that inequity in education can be linked 
directly to relative lower economic growth (Klasen 2002). This underlines the importance of the 
structuralist hypothesis and thus global efforts to enact reforms that support increases in women 
empowerment. For these reasons, women empowerment can have significant, positive effects on 
economic growth.  
2.3. Family Bargaining 
Family bargaining is a key mechanism by which I believe that structural changes in 
family code would increase women empowerment and thus affect overall educational attainment 
in Morocco. In general, this is the mechanism by which reforms, such as family code changes, 
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could have short- and long-term positive impacts on children’s education and women’s labor 
force participation (Agarwal 1997).  The family bargaining theory suggests that households do 
not always make decisions about resource allocation as an entire unit. Instead, contrary to the 
often-used neoclassical unitary model of decision making, intrafamily bargaining is crucial.  
Historically, microeconomic theory solely relied upon the unitary model of the household 
or family (Rode 2011). In this model, the household or family functions under one decision-
making preference and maximizes the utility of the entire unit through the distribution of 
resources under a pooled budgetary constraint (Samuelson 1956).  Thus, in this model, the 
decisions made by the household depend only on the total income brought income brought into 
the unit, not on the income source. However, there is substantial support in the literature that the 
unitary household model is likely not the most accurate way to model household decision 
making (Chiappori et al. 2009) Specifically, the amount of power, be it economic, legal, 
political, social, or other, held by different family members affects the outcome of key decisions 
(Alderman et al. 1995) Models that consider frameworks in which the source of income or 
amount of resources held by different members of the household or family unit can affect 
demand to be non-unitary (Chiappori et al. 2009). 
The non-unitary or family bargaining model demonstrates that “…the distribution of 
well-being among family members reflects their individual economic opportunities outside that 
family.” (McElroy 1997 p. 54) Broadly, models of non-unitary behavior can be divided into 
cooperative and non-cooperative models (Chiappori et al. 2009). The results of cooperative 
models, where all members of the unit participate in decision making, are Pareto efficient. 
However, in non-cooperative models, where some members of the family are deprived of agency 
in decision-making, the outcome is not necessarily Pareto efficient.  
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The first significant cooperative, non-unitary model is the Nash bargaining model 
(Manser and Brown, 1980). This model was the first to consider separate utility functions and 
threat points for each member of the household. A generalization of this model, the collective 
model, uses a pooled budget constraint to maximize a weighted sum of each members’ utility 
(Chiappori 1988). The implication is that, though the “power” of each member may differ, the 
outcome of any decision is Pareto efficient. The threat point in cooperative models is often 
divorce, but Lundberg and Pollak achieve satisfactory empirical results by defining the threat 
point as any non-cooperative equilibrium (Lundberg and Pollak 1993).  This concept is 
demonstrated by an empirical study of child benefits in the United Kingdom (Lundberg, Pollak, 
and Wales 1997).  Essentially, the child benefit was redirected by the government from husbands 
to wives in most cases through a weekly payment instead of simply a tax benefit for the working 
spouse, usually only the husband. Under the unitary model, the distribution of resources would 
not change; however, this policy change resulted an increase investment of resources into women 
and children’s clothing as well as children’s educational expenses. This supports the “separate 
spheres” bargaining hypothesis, where there does not need exist the “threat” of divorce to 
support a change in family decision making outcomes.  
The cooperative model is helpful in understanding family and household decision making 
behavior. However, realistically, there are so many clearly inefficient outcomes observed in 
family and household units--for example, domestic abuse and child neglect are two stark 
examples (Lundberg and Pollak 2008). Therefore, it seems important to consider models that 
produce inefficient outcomes. These non-cooperative models differ from the cooperative models 
in that they allow the potential for inefficient outcomes through the absence of a pooled budget 
constraint. In this model, each member of the household maximizes their own utility to produce 
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outcomes that can be efficient but are usually not. There is evidence that cultural factors can play 
a role in the presence of a non-cooperative bargaining situation, where distribution of resources 
depends on the amount of power held by the husband or wife (Lundberg and Pollak 1994). 
While cooperation is an important consideration, I will consider family bargaining issues 
through the “separate spheres” bargaining model. The presence of Pareto inefficient outcomes is 
not negligible, but it is relatively small and difficult to estimate. Additionally, using the “separate 
spheres” and other closely related models, there is a significant amount of empirical evidence 
based on data from real experiments that that changes in relative wealth or power among 
members of a household or family will change the resource distribution outcome (Attanasio and 
Lechene 2002). Generally, empirical studies of household situations show that an increased 
income of the wife translates into increased spending on women’s and children’s food and 
clothing and decreased spending on services and “adult” foods and beverages (Chiappori et al. 
2009). Furthermore, other studies, such as Harari’s analysis of Kenyan inheritance rights and 
bargaining power, demonstrate that women don’t have to literally bring in more income to affect 
changes in resource allocation (Harari 2014). Changes in legal and political rights that increase 
the power of the woman within the family can also have similar effects. For these reasons, policy 
reform can be an effective tool for enhancing women empowerment, even for issues at which it 
is not directly targeted (McElroy 1998). It is for this reason that the Moroccan Moudawana 
reform could be linked to increased women empowerment.  
3. Moroccan and Egyptian Moudawana 
As discussed above, development policies can have positive, significant effects on the 
economic growth and development of a country and should be encouraged; however, they should 
never be assumed to be gender neutral by default. When these policies encourage equitable 
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opportunity and agency structures in society, this redistribution of power can have significant 
effects on decision making about resource distribution within the household. For this reason, the 
Moroccan Moudawana, by giving equitable rights to women in the family, likely has significant, 
positive effects on women empowerment and thus on outcomes for women and children.  
3.1. Discussion of Country Level Statistics 	 In order to compare Morocco and with a control country in a difference-in-differences 
analysis, they must be broadly similar. For this analysis, the operational difference is the 
reformed Moudawana in Morocco and a more conservative, traditional Moudawana, like the 
Moudawana in Morocco pre-reform, in the control country. I uses a discussion of country level 
statistics of Arab countries in the MENA region to conclude that Egypt is the best fit for the 
country of comparison. Though dissimilarities exist, I believe that this comparison is adequate 
enough to be helpful in discussing this issue although not flawless.  
Freedom House, a nongovernmental resource organization that advocates for civil 
liberties and political rights, has given each country in the MENA region an equity score in five 
subcategories, with each score ranging from 1 (least equitable) to 5 (most equitable). To produce 
these scores, over 40 local and international scholars work for a period of 20 months of 
investigation. The five subcategories are as follows: Non-Discrimination and Access to Justice; 
Autonomy, Security, and Freedom of the Person; Economic Rights and Equal Opportunity; 
Political Rights and Civic Voice; Social and Cultural Rights. This is a quantitative, objective way 
to evaluate the relative opportunity and agency structures of each country.  
For the year 2003, not factoring in the Moudawana reform, these figures are available for 
all Arab countries in the MENA region, as shown below in Table 2. 
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Table 1 Freedom House Scores of Arab Middle Eastern Countries, 2003 
Country 
Non-
Discrimination 
and Access to 
Justice 
Autonomy, 
Security, 
and Freedom 
of the 
Person 
Economic 
Rights and 
Equal 
Opportunity 
Political 
Rights and 
Civic Voice 
Social and 
Cultural 
Rights 
Algeria 3.0 2.4 2.8 3.0 2.9 
Bahrain 2.2 2.3 2.9 2.1 2.8 
Egypt 3.0 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.9 
Iraq 2.7 2.6 2.8 2.2 2.1 
Jordan 2.4 2.4 2.8 2.8 2.5 
Kuwait 1.9 2.2 2.9 1.4 2.8 
Lebanon 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.9 2.9 
Libya 2.3 2.1 2.3 1.2 1.8 
Morocco 3.2 3.2 3.1 3.0 3.0 
Oman 2.0 2.1 2.7 1.2 2.1 
Palestine 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.6 2.9 
Qatar 2.0 2.1 2.8 1.7 2.5 
Saudi Arabia 1.2 1.1 1.4 1.0 1.6 
Syria 2.7 2.2 2.8 2.2 2.3 
Tunisia 3.6 3.3 3.1 2.8 3.3 
UAE 1.7 2.1 2.8 1.2 2.3 
Yemen 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.6 2.1 
Source: Freedom House, 2005 
It should be noted that these 2003 figures for Morocco do not factor in the Moudawana 
reform. Of these listed Arab countries in the MENA region that I could potentially use for my 
difference-in-difference analysis, only three other countries have roughly similar scores to 
Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia. Tunisia instituted a secular family policy reform in 1956 
that was instituted top-down. Therefore, Tunisia is not an appropriate case for comparison. 
Algeria and Egypt, however, both have a more traditional, conservative family code based on 
Shar’iah.  I will further evaluate the merits of Algeria and Egypt to use for difference-in-
differences analysis. The 2005 United Nations Human Development Report for the MENA 
region provides 2003 data on a variety of socioeconomic variables. Some selected variables are 
shown below in Table 2 for Algeria, Egypt, and Morocco. 
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Table 2 Comparative Statistics for Morocco, Egypt, and Algeria 
 2003  
 
Morocco Egypt Algeria 
Human Development Index (0-1) .631 .659 .722 
GDP per capita (PPP US$) 4,004 3,950 3,576 
Net Primary Enrollment Rate (%) 90 91 96 
Annual Population Growth Rate (%) 1.4 1.8 1.3 
Total Fertility Rate (%) 3.3 2.8 2.41 
Life Expectancy at Birth (Years) 69.7 69.8 71.1 
Life Expectancy, Female (Years) 71.9 72.1 73.5 
Life Expectancy, Male (Years) 67.5 67.7 69.4 
Adult Literacy Rate, Female (%) 38.3 43.6 64.0 
Adult Literacy Rate, Male (%) 63.3 67.2 81.1 
GINI Index Score (0-100) 34.4 39.5 35.3 
Education Index .58 .62 .71 
GDP Index .62 .61 .69 
Source: United Nations 2005, World Bank 
 
In close to every category, Morocco is notably more similar to Egypt than Algeria  
(UNHDR 2005). Of these similarities, two merit a mention. Their respective GDP per capita 
figures are very similar, with Egypt at $3,950 PPP, US$ and Morocco at 4,004 PPP, US$. 
Additionally, the 2003 net primary enrollment rates of Egypt and Morocco are 90% and 91%, 
respectively. These measures demonstrate that the economic and educational situations as well as 
relative gender equity of the average person in Morocco and Egypt are very similar. However, 
there are also important differences to consider that could have an effect on my analysis.  
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In 2003, Morocco and Egypt had very similar fertility rates, with Morocco 2.9% and 
Egypt 3.1%. However, in the period from 2003-2010, Morocco underwent a demographic 
transition, the extent of which is unclear, but it is thought that by 2010, the fertility rate in 
Morocco had dropped by some estimates to 2.4% percent while it hovered around 2.8% in Egypt 
(Achy 2010). This is a remarkably rapid demographic transition. In real terms, this causes less 
stress on public resources such as school. Additionally, because the population is growing much 
more slowly, Morocco’s GDP per capita grows much more rapidly. However, the GDP growth 
rates of Morocco and Egypt remain relatively similar. Even so, it is possible that this 
demographic transition could potentially skew my analysis.  
There also exist some statistics suggesting a diverging poverty trend in the two countries. 
In Morocco, by it’s own national standards, the percent of people living below the poverty line 
was 15.3% in 2000 and 8.9% in 2000. By Egyptian national standards, this was 16.7% in 1999 
and 21.6% in 2008. Unfortunately, this is the only data that I have been able to find. These two 
data points do suggest a diverging poverty trend, but the data is problematic due to the fact that 
more data points are not available and that these are only issued by the respective standards of 
each country, not by international standards. Data by international standards is only available for 
Morocco in 2000 and 2006, in which it is 6.3% and 3.1% respectively, much lower than the 
national guideline statistics. However, if people in Morocco are becoming richer and people in 
Egypt are becoming poorer, would certainly affect this study. I will further elaborate on this in 
the limitations section. 
 A well-documented countervailing force in Morocco is its reputation for its poor human 
capital situation (Achy 2010). Its illiteracy rate remains higher than Morocco and Egypt, even 
given the increase in GDP per capita, and Egypt has a reputation for having a slightly better 
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developed educational system then in Morocco. Inequality also remains substantially higher in 
Morocco than in Egypt, with the Moroccan tax code benefitting the rich, urban population at the 
expense of the rural poor. It is important to discuss and acknowledge these differences, and I 
note that any of these could potentially impact my analysis. However, I believe that the 
comparison in Morocco and Egypt is close enough that comparing them in difference-in-
difference analysis is more helpful than comparing Morocco alone, as I have shown there is no 
other suitable match in the MENA region.   
Given these similar national-level statistics at the start time of this study, combined with 
similar opportunity and agency structures as represented by the Freedom House scores, Morocco 
and Egypt are suitable candidates for this difference-in-differences study. The treatment, or the 
key difference which I will study, is a 2004 personal status or “Moudawana” reform in Morocco 
that I will suggest caused a significant increase in women empowerment. 
The 2004 Moroccan Moudawana reform as well as the success of the larger Moroccan 
feminist movement are unmatched in the contemporary Arab world. I will discuss how this 
reform was accomplished by briefly detailing the history of family law or personal status laws in 
Morocco and Egypt, a comparable Arab country where only much more modest family reforms 
have happened in contemporary history. Additionally, I will discuss other relevant laws, such as 
education policies that Morocco and Egypt have in common. These explanations support my 
argument that these two countries are good comparison cases for use in this difference-in-
differences study.  
3.2. Morocco 
 The modern movement for women’s rights in Morocco dates back to colonial Morocco 
and the 1946 “Sisters of Purity” organization, which released a then-optimistic list of demands 
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that included “…the abolition of polygamy, full and equal political rights, and increased 
visibility in the public sphere” (Sadiqi 2010, web). Many female professors and writers, as well 
as a wide span of civil society, adopted these demands. When Morocco became independent in 
1956, it quickly released its first personal status code termed “Moudawana,” which solely and 
thoroughly regulated family matters, including marriage, divorce, and inheritance. This code was 
incredibly disappointing to the entire women’s movement.  
 Far from adopting the demands of the Sisters of Purity, the first Moudawana reflected the 
Maliki school of Islamic jurisprudence, subject to a conservative interpretation of the Quran. At 
the time, many laws regarding banking, the finance sector, and the penal code adhered to a civil 
code that dramatically diverged from traditional Quranic thought.  Moudawana was the only law 
that strictly adhered to religious fundamentals and tribal norms (Zvan 2007). Under this first 
Moudawana,  “...men could unilaterally divorce their wives while women's right to divorce was 
highly restricted; women could not marry without legal approval from a guardian or tutor; 
married women were obliged by law to obey their husbands; and men could marry multiple 
women without their wives' consent” (Touimi-Benjelloon 2008, web). 
 Over the next roughly forty years, women continued to organize, publishing newspapers 
and magazines, holding marches, and circulating petitions. They continued to face resistance 
from the Islamist party (the PJD) and various Islamist groups, who believed that their demands 
were not compatible with Islam. A notable effort occurred in 1992-1993, when the Union de 
l’Action Feminine (UAF) circulated a petition encouraging a more equitable Moudawana reform 
that garnered over a million signees and has been termed the One Million Signatures campaign 
(Zvan 2007). In the year 1993, Morocco ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) which was a notable step forward, although 
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Morocco formally set a list of reservations to the CEDAW provisions. (These provisions were 
still technically in place until 2008 (Hanafi 2013). The women’s movement as well as the push 
from the international community through CEDAW resulted in a very minor and largely 
inconsequential reform made by King Hassan II, who was notorious for his conservative views 
and corruption among his administration (Zvam 2007). However, the women’s  movement 
viewed this as a small success because it meant that change in the Moudawana was possible.  
When King Hassan II died in 1999 and King Mohamed VI, who was rumored to have 
more “modern” or relatively liberal views, took the throne, the efforts of the women’s movement 
and the international community were revitalized (Sadiqi 2010). The international community 
was very hopeful that his reign could be used to address many human rights issues in Morocco. 
For this reason, a large number of NGO’s, with support from the World Bank, launched “…a 
campaign to promote women’s participation in public life and development” (Harrak 2009 p.4) 
Encouraged by this, the then Secretary of State for Childhood and Family Issues Said Saadi 
authored and presented a proposal to promote the status of women to democracy. This proposal 
was directly linked to various United Nations declarations and the resolutions from the 1995 
Beijing United Nations conference. However, while this project received intensive support from 
civil society, it was never fully supported by the government or Moroccan society entirely. 
Public debate about this was demonstrated by two Moroccan marches in March of 2000. One, in 
favor of Said’s plan, was held in Rabat and 500,000 people attended. An opposing rally in 
Casablanca counted more than 2,000,000 people in attendance. The sheer amount of support and 
dissent show how this was (and remains) a contentious societal issue where the international 
community and a large part of the Moroccan society are in opposition.  
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The effort of the Moroccan women’s movement and the international development 
community culminated in the Moudawana reform of 2004, which is  discussed in detail in 
section r. Throughout the globe, this reform is hailed as victory for women that is unique in the 
Arab world. “The new Mudawwana jettisoned the patriarchal model of the family,” argues 
Margot Badran, a distinguished scholar and historian of the Middle East and gender,  “alleged to 
be the authentic Islamic model of the family, in favor of an egalitarian family model based upon 
the shar'iah… This was a victory that Egyptians could not achieve after a century of demands 
and activist efforts” (Badran 2008, italics original, web). 
3.2. Egypt 
Egypt’s personal status code was first established in the 1920’s, and has been a principal 
source of gender-based discrimination since its inception (Tadros 2010). Interestingly, Egypt had 
an even more extensive and active women’s movement that began around this time, just after the 
revolution in 1919, and continued throughout the 20th century led by groups such as the 
Egyptian Feminist Union (Khalifa 1973). The agenda of these groups included a vast reform of 
the Moudawana, equal access to education for males and females, and equitable labor 
opportunities. Starting in 1945, this women’s movement “came of age” and reinvigorated itself 
by gaining a larger audience and linking the campaign for social reforms to women’s political 
rights (Khater and Nelson 1988).  During this entire period, women’s groups were fighting 
ardently with male nationalists as well as Islamist groups. The women’s movement, which had a 
reputation for militancy, was ended abruptly under the rule of Gamal Abdel Nasser from 1952-
1970. However, Nasser’s regime did have a commitment to “social egalitarianism.” For example, 
the 1956 revised constitution gave women political and voting rights as well as reformed the 
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educational system to increase primary and secondary enrollment in education. Despite this, the 
conservative personal status laws remained (Hatem 1993). Hatem argues: 
“State feminism under the Nasser regime produced women who were economically 
independent of their families, but dependent on the state… While state feminism created 
and organized a system of public patriarchy, it did not challenge the personal and familial 
views of women’s dependency on men that were institutionalized by the personal status 
laws and the political system.” (1992, p. 233) 
Under the Sadat regime, however, from 1970-1981, many of these economic freedoms 
were removed under his “infitah” policies. The Egyptian government utterly abandoned its prior 
commitments to gender equality. Although somewhat paradoxically, pressure from then First 
Lady Jehan Sedat led to few minor Moudawana reforms that gave women limited legal rights in 
marriage and divorce in 1979. However, in 1985, under the Mubarak regime with intense 
pressure from Islamists, the Moudawana was amended and many of these limited freedoms were 
rescinded. The conservative stronghold on the Egyptian government continued, and the personal 
status code or Moudawana has only very minor reforms since 1985 (Al-Ali et al. 2002). In 2000, 
it became legal for a woman to divorce her husband if she repaid the dowry and forfeited all 
financial rights. It is worth noting that Egypt has made a few important legal reforms since the 
time of this study, such as increasing the minimum marriage age to 18 for all people, reforming 
child custody laws moderately, and criminalizing female genital mutilation (World Bank 2010). 
4. Moroccan Moudawana Reform 
Throughout the Arab world, personal status laws or Moudawana are viewed as a principle 
source of gender discrimination legally and practically (Tadros 2010). The Moudawana is “...a 
collection of legal rules that organize kinship relationships. It regulates the rights and duties 
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pertaining to marriage, the custody of children, inheritance, divorce, and alimony” (Ghazalla 
2001 p.2).  Scholar Fatima Harrak writes that the reformed Moroccan Moudawana “constitutes a 
landmark in the history of Moroccan and Arab women’s struggle for equality” (Harrak 2011, 
web). The gist of this reform is that it calls for equality between men and women by introducing 
“joint and equal responsibility” in the home and in household affairs. It implements a liberal 
view of Sharia law termed “goals of shar’iah,” which seeks to view the Quran’s instructions 
through a broader lens of God’s goodness, modernity, and fair intentions.  
While the Morocco’s Moudawana was reformed based upon “goals of shar’iah,” Egypt’s 
Moudawana, ratified in 1925, is based strictly on Sharia. It has only seen relatively minor 
reforms since its inception and remains significantly less equitable than Morocco’s Moudawana. 
Especially in a marriage and household, women’s freedoms and decision-making abilities can be 
constrained by her husband, who holds the legal power in an Egyptian marital relationship 
(Tadros 2010). This Egyptian personal status code is a practical, significant source of 
discrimination against women. Table 3 below provides a comparison of Moroccan Moudawana 
pre-2004 reform and post-2004 reform with Egyptian Moudawana in several dimensions.  
Table 3 Comparison of Egyptian and Moroccan Moudawana  
 Egypt  Morocco Morocco pre-2004 
Household 
Equality 
Husband has control of 
household decisions; 
wife legally obligated 
to obey 
Husband and wife 
“share joint 
responsibility of the 
family” 
Husband had control of 
household decisions; 
wife legally obligated to 
obey 
Divorce Men may divorce 
unilaterally; wife may 
apply for divorce, but 
relinquishes her 
custody rights and 
rights to financial 
compensation from 
Both men and women 
may initiate a divorce; 
divorce by mutual 
consent is possible 
Divorce and repudiation 
are left to the discretion 
of the husband only 
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husband 
Polygyny “Allows up to four 
wives; must inform 
prior wives, who may 
divorce if they can 
prove that the 
additional marriage will 
cause them significant 
harm” 
“Women may prohibit 
polygyny in marriage 
contract; all parties 
must be informed 
before the husband 
takes another wife and 
the prior wife can be 
granted a divorce” 
Husbands may take up to 
four wives, if they can 
provide for them 
financially 
Custody A child must be 
transferred from the 
mother to the father, 
unless a judge rules 
alternatively, at age 10 
for boys and 12 for 
girls 
Mother has first right 
to custody until 
children are 18; Father 
may apply for 
visitation 
Fathers have first 
custody rights if women 
remove or leave area 
where husband lives; 
children can choose their 
custodian at age 15 
Marriage Age 18 for males; 16 for 
females 
18 18 for males; 15 for 
females 
Marriage 
Tutorship 
A woman’s must have a 
male guardian who 
serves as a marriage 
tutor; he cannot compel 
a marriage but must 
consent to it 
Women do not require 
“marriage tutors” and 
may negotiate their 
own marriage 
contracts; they cannot 
be compelled to marry 
and need no one’s 
consent 
Women did not have 
control over the marriage 
contract; a marriage tutor 
had to consent to the 
marriage.  Parents could 
compel marriage 
Right to Post-
Marital Career 
and/or Education 
Women do not have the 
right to work 
independent of 
husband’s or other male 
guardian’s approval 
Women are entitled to 
“self-guardianship” in 
all matters, instead of 
requiring a male family 
member 
Spousal approval 
required for continued 
work or education 
Informal 
Marriage (‘urfi) 
Informal marriages are 
legal, can be easily 
dissolved, and are often 
used for the sexual 
exploitation of women 
Informal marriage is 
illegal 
Informal marriage is not 
specifically illegal but 
also it not legal 
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Implementation No implementation 
clause is found in the 
Moudawana 
Specifically calls for 
judiciary system to 
uphold the rules of this 
family law; calls for 
the public prosecutor 
to be part of every 
Family Law action 
No implementation 
clause was found in the 
Moudawana 
Mobility Unmarried women 
under age 21 must 
obtain permission from 
their father or male 
guardian before 
traveling and/or 
obtaining a passport 
No permission needed 
if over 18 (same for 
males and females) 
Women required to have 
a male guardian with 
control over travel and 
other decisions 
Domestic 
Violence 
Personal status code 
does not mention 
domestic violence 
Domestic violence is 
grounds for divorce 
Personal status code does 
not mention domestic 
violence 
Source: Woodrow Wilson Center 2005; Morocco 2003; Morocco 1986; Egypt 2000. 
 
Many of these differences are important and worth highlighting. The key difference, 
which illustrates the spirit of the Moudawana reform, is that the reform gives men and women 
completely shared and joint responsibility for the entire family. Accordingly, women now have 
an equal legal opinion in marriage negotiation, divorce, and polygyny. Whether married or 
single, Moroccan women over the age of 18, like men, no longer require male guardianship at 
any time and have complete rights to make decisions about labor and education. Conversely, in 
Egypt, the husband still has legal control over the family and the wife has a legal responsibility 
to obey him and abide by his decisions. Egyptian women must have a male guardian that makes 
or at least must approve of their decisions about seeking education and employment.  
The Moroccan Moudawana is remarkable both for its comprehensiveness as well as its 
accomplishment through advocacy and activism, whereas Egypt’s Moudawana has only been 
reformed top-down by political leaders and is greatly lacking (Hanafi 2013). As shown in Table 
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3, the Moroccan Moudawana is significantly more equitable than the Egyptian Moudawana. I 
will show that these differences in Egyptian and Moroccan personal status codes have 
statistically significant effects on education levels, and suggest that they improve women’s 
participation in the labor force as well as decision-making abilities in the household. In my 
extensive search, I did not find another significant reform that would have gender-specifically 
impacted the opportunity and agency structure of either country during this period or provided 
causes for a positive shock to educational attainment (Sadiqi 2010; Tadros 2010). 
I believe the effects of this treatment are most powerful on the margin. For example, 
women capable of supporting themselves and their children pre-reform would not have been able 
to leave a negligent or abusive male guardian to form their own household may choose to do so 
after the Moudawana reform. Middle class families that have sufficient resources to send the 
female children to secondary school, but choose to allocate them elsewhere, may now choose to 
do so as these girls will have the rights to dictate their own futures and their education may be 
more likely to be used for gain.  
The hypothesis is that the Moudawana reform will be correlated with a significant 
increase in educational attainment in Morocco for children of both genders. The Moudawana 
reform might not make a difference in families too poor to afford any schooling, for mothers 
incapable of working, or for families wealthy enough that sending their girls to school is no 
burden. For this reason, I expect there to be a small yet significant treatment effect. This is 
consistent with the hypothesis about the theoretical pathway of mothers choosing to use their 
new rights to support all of their children, both male and female, by sending them to school and 
ensuring they receive sufficient healthcare. 
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There are two most likely causes for changes in decision outcomes caused by the 
Moroccan Moudawana. In this case, when a woman is empowered by more equitable family 
codes, she may choose to exert her influence to ensure that her children stay in school or receive 
better preventative healthcare (Rubalcava and Thomas 2000). This is heavily supported in the 
literature on family bargaining mentioned earlier on similar cases in Kenya, the United Kingdom 
and Mexico. I believe this is the stronger force in the short term. Additionally, if a girl is likely to 
be more empowered later in life, the family may choose to invest more in her development in 
accordance with an expected higher future income. However, this effect is likely not observed in 
such a short time period after the reform.  
5. Methodology 
The main concepts in my study are women empowerment and opportunity and agency 
structures. I will examine women empowerment through the lense of educational attainment, 
supported by descriptive statistics about entry into the labor force and decision-making power. 
This dependent variable will be measured by years of education for both males and females. The 
research design is a comparative difference-in-differences test using pooled cross-sectional 
survey data from two points in time for Morocco and Egypt from the years 2003-2010, modeled 
on an analysis done in Mariaflavia Harari’s 2014 paper “Women’s Inheritance Rights and 
Bargaining Power: Evidence from Kenya.” The difference-in-differences design will allow me to 
discern the positive effects of economic growth and development over time on increased gender 
equity from the positive impact of more equitable policy.   My treatment, in this case, is the 
mentioned policy reform. Whereas Harari (2014) compares two ethnic groups in her study, 
where one received the treatment and one did not, I compare Morocco and Egypt, as previously 
discussed. This design allows me to rely on a qualitative understanding of each country’s 
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opportunity and agency structures and how they have evolved while also making use of the 
quantitative survey data to control for differences based on region, age, wealth, and other factors.  
The specification of this difference-in-differences model for each gender is as follows: 𝑦 = 𝛼 +  𝛽! ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜 +  𝛽! ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 +  𝛽! ∗𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜 +  𝛽! ∗ 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 +  𝛽!∗ 𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 +  𝜀  
The main coefficient of interest here is 𝛽!, which is the coefficient of treatment. A 
significant, positive treatment coefficient would indicate that the Moudawana reform had a 
significant, positive effect on educational attainment. 𝛽! represents the effect of time on 
educational attainment; as a general trend, the world and the MENA region in general is 
becoming more educated, which I want to isolate. 𝛽! isolates the country effect, and  𝛽! isolates 
the effect of income, and 𝛽! isolates the effect of living in an urban area. Table 4 below lists and 
describes each variable. Initial estimates of this model indicated that it was likely that there are 
gender effects on the treatment coefficient. These estimates by gender of the discussed model 
can be found in the appendix and will briefly be discussed in the results section. Because of the 
observed potential that the independent variables depend on gender, it is necessary to run a full 
unrestricted model that allows the independent variables to interact with gender. The 
specification of this full unrestricted model is found below:  𝑦 = 𝛼 +  𝛽! ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜 +  𝛽! ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 +  𝛽! ∗𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜 +  𝛽! ∗ 𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛 +  𝛽!∗ 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 +  𝛽! ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜 ∗ 𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 +  𝛽! ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽!∗𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜 ∗ 𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽! ∗ 𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛 ∗ 𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 +  𝛽!" ∗ 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ ∗ 𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 +  𝛽!!∗ 𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 + 𝜀  
  Martin  	 30 
 In this model, for example, the treatment coefficient is represented by 𝛽! for males and 
by 𝛽! + 𝛽! for females. A description of each independent variable in either model is found 
below in Table 4. 
Table 4 Variable Descriptions 
Variable Definition 
Post*Morocco This is the treatment variable; equals 1 if the responses were 
recorded after the time of the reform in Morocco and 0 
otherwise 
Post Equals 1 if the response was recorded after the time of the 
reform and 0 otherwise 
Morocco Equals 1 if the subject resides in Morocco and 0 otherwise 
Wealth Index A scale from 1 to 5, with 1 the poorest and 5 the richest 
Urbanity Equals 1 if the respondent lives in a major urban area and 0 
otherwise 
Post*Morocco*Female This is the treatment variable interacted with gender; equals 1 if 
the responses were recorded after the time of the reform in 
Morocco and the respondent is a female and 0 otherwise 
Post*Female Equals 1 if the response was recorded after the time of the 
reform and the respondent is a female and 0 otherwise 
Morocco*Female Equals 1 if the subject resides in Morocco and is a female and 0 
otherwise 
Wealth Index* Female The interaction of the wealth index and gender 
Urbanity*Female Equals 1 if the respondent lives in a major urban area and is a 
female and 0 otherwise 
Female Equals 1 if the respondent is a female and 0 otherwise 
 
I estimate the regression model to survey respondents under the age of 30, that is, those 
young enough to have been affected by the reform.  Additionally, I will use descriptive statistics 
from the 2010 World Bank Morocco and Youth Household Survey to support the claim that 
increased women’s empowerment in the family and household leads to more equitable outcomes 
for the women and children. Although this analysis is restricted to a single year’s class, it will 
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further illuminate the current women empowerment situation in Morocco, as well as the various 
decision making outcomes of women.  
6. Data 
Quantitative data that can be used to analyze these outcomes are fairly scarce. I use 
Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data for Morocco in 2003 and Egypt in 2003 and 2008, 
supplemented by more recent World Bank Household and Youth Survey data for Morocco in 
2009. The DHS Survey is public health focused, while the World Bank Survey is centered on 
economic conditions. Both are reputable, widely used services with excellent surveying and 
sampling techniques. The questions used for comparison have nearly identical wording. (DHS; 
World Bank) In order to conduct the analysis, I did have to use the World Bank survey to 
construct some of the measures used by the DHS, such as the Wealth Index. I constructed the 
Wealth Index by analyzing the type of housing in which a survey respondent resided, as well as 
their ownership of certain consumer semi-luxury goods, such as televisions and computers. The 
wealth index I constructed has a similar mean and standard deviation to the DHS wealth index, 
as shown in the Results section in Tables 5-8. This data is available for download to registered 
users on the DHS and World Bank websites and each set of responses is available in several 
formats. Both surveys are incredibly large both in scope and number of observations. Data 
describing the population I am testing can be found below in Table 5. 
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Table 5 Descriptive Statistics 
 
  Morocco 2003   Egypt 2003 
Variable   Obs. Mean Std. Dev.  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
Sex  64044 0.519 0.500   52945 0.491 0.500 
Age  64038 27.216 19.694   52943 25.057 18.759 
Highest Ed. Level  64036 0.769 0.864   52945 1.129 1.005 
Urban  64044 0.494 0.500   52945 0.608 0.488 
Wealth Index (1 to 
5) 
 64044 2.849 1.422   52495 2.820 1.439 
Primary School  64036 0.520 0.500   52945 0.633 0.482 
Secondary School  64036 0.214 0.410   52945 0.415 0.493 
 
  Morocco 2010      Egypt 2008-2009 
Variable   Obs.  Mean Std. Dev.      Obs.  Mean Std. Dev. 
Sex  10769 0.502 0.500      92120 0.495 0.500 
Age  10769 29.557 19.938      92120 25.709 18.889 
Highest Ed. Level  9907 0.979 0.888      92120 1.129 1.005 
Urban  10769 0.434 0.496      92120 0.585 0.493 
Wealth Index (1 to 5)  10683 2.957 1.072      92120 2.895 1.420 
Primary School  9907 0.638 0.481      92120 0.665 0.472 
Secondary School  9907 0.300 0.458      92120 0.446 0.497 
Source: World Bank 2010; DHS 2003, 2003-2004, 2008-2009 
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7. Data Analysis Results 
7.1 Regression Results 
 Regression results of the full unrestricted model can be found below in Table 6.  
Table 6 Unrestricted regression results  
Variable 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
t 
(p-values) 
Post*Morocco 1.830 
(0.115) 
15.79 
(0.000) 
Post 0.065 
(0.048) 
1.35 
(0.176) 
Morocco -1.631 
(0.053) 
-30.50 
(0.000) 
Urban 0.432 
(0.050) 
8.58 
(0.000) 
Wealth Index 0.629 
(0.017) 
35.59 
(0.000) 
Post*Morocco*Female -0.229 
(0.144) 
-1.40 
(0.163) 
Post*Female 0.342 
(0.069) 
4.97 
(0.000) 
Morocco*Female -0.188 
(0.075) 
-2.49 
(0.013) 
Urban*Female 0.211 
(0.071) 
2.96 
(0.003) 
Wealth Index*Female 0.484 
(0.025) 
19.31 
(0.000) 
Female -2.384 
(0.078) 
-30.39 
(0.000) 
Constant 5.533 
(0.055) 
100.46 
(0.000) 
-- -- -- 
R-Squared 0.1023  
Observations 141, 402  
Breusch-Pagan 
(p-value) 
2543.36 
(0.000) 
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I conducted a Breusch-Pagan/ Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity for this 
regression. Heteroskedasticity violates the fifth fundamental assumption of multiple linear 
regression, the homoscedasticity assumption, which is that variance is constant or, more 
precisely, “…the error u [𝜀 in this model] has the same variance given any value of the 
explanatory variables” (Wooldridge 2013, p. 62). If this assumption is violated and there is 
heteroskedasticity present in the model, the estimated standard deviations and t-statistics are 
likely to be biased.  However, even in the presence of heteroskedasticity, the estimated 
coefficients remain unbiased. For this test, the null hypothesis is that there is no 
heteroskedasticity, or more specifically, that variance is constant. I found a 𝜆! value of 2453.36 
with a 0.000 significance level, which means that null hypothesis is rejected and suggests that 
this data does suffer from heteroskedasticity.  
I have corrected for this by using robust standard errors and t-statistics. This estimated 
model can be found below in Table 7.  
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Table 7 Unrestricted regression results with robust standard errors and t statistics  
Variable 
Coefficient 
(Robust Std. Error) 
t 
(p-values) 
Post*Morocco 1.830 
(0.100) 
18.36 
(0.000) 
Post 0.065 
(0.051) 
1.28 
(0.202) 
Morocco -1.631 
(0.052) 
-31.32 
(0.000) 
Urban 0.432 
(0.051) 
8.43 
(0.000) 
Wealth Index 0.629 
(0.018) 
34.28 
(0.000) 
Post*Morocco*Female -0.229 
(0.144) 
-1.59 
(0.111) 
Post*Female 0.342 
(0.073) 
4.70 
(0.000) 
Morocco*Female -0.188 
(0.073) 
-2.58 
(0.010) 
Urban*Female 0.211 
(0.073) 
2.90 
(0.004) 
Wealth Index*Female 0.484 
(0.026) 
18.72 
(0.000) 
Female -2.384 
(0.080) 
-29.97 
(0.000) 
Constant 5.533 
(0.056) 
98.02 
(0.000) 
-- -- -- 
R-Squared 0.1023  
Observations 141, 402  
 
Additionally, in order to identify the sources of heteroskedasticity in the model, I 
estimated the model using the squared residuals as the dependent variable. The results of this are 
found below in Table 8. 
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Table 8 Regression on squared residuals 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
t 
(p-values) 
Post*Morocco -3.592 
(0.522) 
-6.88 
(0.000) 
Post -0.184 
(0.217) 
-0.85 
(0.397) 
Morocco -9.203 
(0.241) 
--38.21 
(0.000) 
Urban -1.489 
(0.227) 
-6.56 
(0.000) 
Wealth Index 2.293 
(0.080) 
28.78 
(0.000) 
Post*Morocco*Female 2.800 
(0.741) 
3.77 
(0.000) 
Post*Female 1.094 
(0.310) 
3.53 
(0.000) 
Morocco*Female -1.257 
(0.340) 
-3.70 
(0.000) 
Urban*Female 2.461 
(0.322) 
7.65 
(0.000) 
Wealth Index*Female 0.454 
(0.113) 
4.02 
(0.000) 
Female -2.858 
(0.353) 
-8.09 
(0.000) 
Constant 24.040 
(0.248) 
96.89 
(0.000) 
-- -- -- 
R-Squared 0.0636  
Observations 141, 402  
  
These results indicate that there are many sources of heteroskedasticity in this model. The 
only independent variable above that is not significant in this regression is the Post variable, 
which differentiates between time periods. Again, I have attempted to correct for the 
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heteroskedasticity found in the model by using robust standard errors, the results of which are 
found  above in Table 7.   
 As discussed, the most important coefficients are the treatment coefficients. For 
males, this is represented as 𝜷𝟏, and for females, this is equal to 𝜷𝟏 +  𝜷𝟔. The estimated value 
of the treatment effect is positive for both genders. For males, this value is 1.830, meaning that 
for males the treatment is associated with an increase of 1.830 years of education on average. For 
females, the value for this coefficient is 1.601, meaning that for females the treatment is 
associated with an increase of 1.601 years of education on average. I tested the hypothesis that 
there is a significant treatment effect; specifically, the null hypothesis is that 𝛽! = 𝛽! = 0. This 
test has a result of f=286.50, with a p-value of 0.000. Thus, we can reject the null hypothesis that 
there is no treatment effect at the 99% significant level. Additionally, I used an F-test to test 
whether or not the treatment effect depends on gender. Specifically, the null hypothesis is that 𝛽! 
is equal to zero. This test has a result with a result of F=2.54 with a p-value of 0.111. Thus, we 
fail to reject the hypothesis that the treatment effect depends on gender. Thus, we can conclude 
that the treatment coefficients for males and females are not statistically significantly different. 
These estimated values and statistical tests are consistent with the hypothesis that the 
Moudawana reform is associated with an increase in educational attainment. 
Because this study period occurs over a relatively short period of time directly following 
the reform, one potential explanation for why the treatment effect doesn’t depend on gender is 
that the increased relative return on investment of girls’ education as an incentive to increased 
educational attainment is not present. That is, an increase in women empowerment would in the 
long turn encourage families to send their daughters to school longer, as they will be able to 
make their own choices about employment or graduate school in the future and thus be better 
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able to reap the benefits of schooling. However, it seems unlikely that families would realize this 
so soon after the reform. Thus, the effect being roughly the same for males and females is 
consistent with the short-term hypothesis that increasing women empowerment increases 
educational attainment for children. 
 Aside from this main conclusion, there are other interesting results of this study. The 
estimated wealth index coefficient, represented by 𝜷𝟓 for males, is 0.629; for females, 
represented by 𝜷𝟓 +  𝜷𝟏𝟎, the estimated value is 1.113. So, the estimated value for females is 
roughly twice that for males. This suggests that female education may be consumed as a luxury 
good, as it is positively correlated with a rise in income, whereas male education is seen as more 
of a necessity.  
 Both male and female education is significantly and positively correlated with urbanity. 
This is expected, as education and attendance are typically better in cities. Additionally, as I will 
discuss later, there is evidence that there is a lack of knowledge about and enforcement of the 
Moudawana in rural areas, so this positive coefficient supports the hypothesis that the 
Moudawana is correlated with this increase in educational attainment. The constant for males is 
6.397, while the constant for females is 4.436, suggesting that average female educational 
attainment is still far behind average male educational attainment. 
The small, positive values for the Post coefficient, representing change over time are 
expected and in accordance with a general increase in education over time. The negative values 
for 𝜷𝟑, the Morocco coefficient, are negative, which is unsurprising given that the educational 
system in Egypt is on the whole marginally more developed than in Morocco.  
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7.2 Discussion of Descriptive Statistics 
 The results of selected questions of the 2010 World Bank Morocco Household and Youth 
Survey, found below in Tables 8 and 9, are also worth discussing.  
Table 9 Descriptive Statistics: Bargaining Power 
Of women under 29, in the household, who decided if you did or not 
stay in school? 
Frequency Percent 
Woman herself 879 54.46 
Father decides alone 401 24.85 
Mother decides alone 25 1.55 
Father and his Spouse 136 8.43 
Father and Woman 13 0.81 
Father and Spouse of Woman 61 3.78 
Father and Male Relatives 21 1.30 
Other comb. of relatives 9 0.56 
Woman’s Husband Alone 40 2.48 
Husband and Wife Together 24 1.49 
Husband and Woman’s Mother 1 0.06 
Too Old to Study 4 0.25 
Total 1614 100.0 
Source: World Bank 2010 
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Table 10 Further Descriptive Statistics: Bargaining Power 
 
Of women 15-49 in the household, who 
decided if you seek or remain in paid 
employment? 
All Respondents Respondents in paid 
employment or seeking work 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Woman herself 1273 41.86 285 81.66 
Father decides alone 356 11.71 18 5.16 
Mother decides alone 30 0.99 6 1.72 
Father and his Spouse 52 1.71 2 0.57 
Father and Woman 30 0.99 2 0.57 
Father and Spouse of Woman 65 2.14 7 2.01 
Father and Male Relatives 82 2.70 5 1.43 
Other comb. of relatives 42 1.38 0 0.00 
Woman’s Husband Alone 789 25.95 3 0.86 
Husband and Wife Together 292 9.6 21 6.02 
Husband and Woman’s Mother 12 0.39 0 0.00 
Too Old to Work 18 0.59 0 0.00 
Total 3041 100.0 349 100.0 
Source: World Bank 2010 
 
The first question was restricted to women under 29. Of these women, only 54.46% 
reported that they were deciding for themselves whether or not to stay in school. Granted, some 
of these respondents are under 18 and still likely responsible to their parents legally. 
Furthermore, of women aged 15-49, only 41.86% decided themselves if they could seek or 
remain in paid employment. Significantly, of this 41.86%, 81.66 % were in paid employment or 
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seeking work. 11.77% of women answered that their fathers alone were responsible for their 
employment choices and 25.95% of spouses alone. Of these women, 5.16% and 0.86% 
respectively were in paid employment or seeking work.  
Additionally, as previously discussed, Morocco underwent a rapid demographic 
transition during the time period of this study, with fertility rates dropping from roughly 2.9% to 
2.4%. I was not able to confirm this with survey data, but the decrease in fertility rates over time 
at the national level is also associated with an increase in women empowerment. These figures 
suggest that Moudawana abeyance and enforcement is still subject to fairly strict cultural 
patriarchal norms. While it seems through this analysis that Moudawana reform has given 
women increased bargain power, it is also likely that complete equity in intrafamily decision 
making is far from achieved.   
8. Limitations 
The differing focuses of the two surveys severely limited the scope of this study. Apart 
from basic personal information, the two surveys, the DHS survey and the World Bank Morocco 
Household and Youth Survey, were almost completely disjoint in available information. 
Preferably, I would have used a DHS survey from Morocco in the 2008-2010, but as USAID 
phased out of Morocco with its 2003-04 survey, this is non-existent. The DHS survey mainly 
focuses on health and family, while the survey done by the World Bank almost solely focuses on 
economic opportunity. The only significant intersection of information availability that I can find 
is in the studied topic, educational attainment, which determined the choice of the dependent 
variable. A significant area for future research is finding and/or developing other data that could 
further illuminate the women empowerment externalities of this reform, such as more developed 
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labor force participation data and analysis or an exploration of children’s preventative healthcare 
outcomes.   
Additionally, it is impossible to eliminate the possibility that other factors in Morocco 
and Egypt are at play. As acknowledged, the factors affecting educational attainment could 
include the Moroccan demographic transition and higher relative poverty reduction. Because 
difference-in-differences analysis relies on the assumption that the two cases are equal except for 
one pivotal change, differences between Morocco and Egypt certainly could affect this study. 
Both of these factors would likely bias the analysis in favor of increased education in Morocco. I 
attempted to find a way to determine which respondents were above or below the poverty line, 
but this was not possible with available data. In future research, finding a way to incorporate a 
measure of poverty and fertility into this analysis would be beneficial.  
9. Barriers to Implementation/ Realization 
Despite these developments, Morocco still faces significant obstacles in establishing 
gender equity in opportunity and agency structures. A study published in 2013 by Danish Centre 
for Research and Information on Gender, Equality, and Diversity discusses the obstacles to 
enforcement of the Moudawana that exist in Morocco (Hanafi 2013). Hanafi analyzed 
implementation through a series of stakeholder interviews and a significant legal analysis as well 
as a public perception analysis. She found that there is a significant gap between the rural and 
urban enforcement of the Moudawana. “The views of a segment of civil society members,” she 
writes, “is that knowledge about the Moudawana has not spread consistently or evenly to 
Moroccans who live outside urban centers” (Hanafi 2013 p. 11). Additionally, there has not been 
an extensive training of judges and other public officials on how to handle adjudication of the 
new policies. In general, Moroccan courts are very slow and heavily dependent on judicial 
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discretion, so there is a wide range of outcomes possible in the court for cases tried based on the 
new Moudawana.  
Additionally, it is difficult for women, especially illiterate women, to become informed 
about the Moudawana (Hanafi 2013). As 65% of Moroccan women were illiterate in 2003, there 
are likely a significant number of women that still could not read a Moudawana pamphlet if they 
were given one. Furthermore, as discussed, women’s educational attainment at the end time of 
this study was still on the average much lower than men’s. For women to achieve empowerment 
in society, this educational gap has to continue to improve.  For these reasons, as supported by 
the descriptive statistics, I believe Morocco still has room to improve gender equity in both the 
public and private sphere. However, the model demonstrates that the reform may have helped to 
bring about significant improvements, even with its deficiencies.  
10. Conclusion 
Through this analysis, I have suggested that the Moroccan Moudawana supports and 
encourages increased educational attainment, and have suggested that the mechanism by which 
this occurs is increased women empowerment in intrafamily bargaining. These results suggest 
that reforms aimed at making opportunity and agency structures more equitable can have 
positive impacts on women empowerment, even in the presence of contradictory social norms 
and subpar enforcement. Therefore, legislative reforms towards more gender equitable policy 
can be worthwhile goals even when they might seem to be subject to intense social and political 
disapproval.  
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Appendix 1 Regressions Separated By Genders	
 Years Education of Males Under 30 Years Education of Females Under 
30  
Variable Coefficient 
(Robust Std. Error) 
t 
(p-values) 
Coefficient 
(Robust Std. Error) 
t 
(p-values) 
Post*Morocco 1.830 
(0.100) 
18.36 
(0.000) 
1.601 
(0.104) 
15.35 
(0.000) 
Post 0.065 
(0.051) 
1.28 
(0.202) 
0.408 
(0.052) 
7.85 
(0.000) 
Morocco -1.631 
(0.052) 
-31.32 
(0.000) 
-1.819 
(0.051) 
-35.69 
(0.000) 
Urban 0.432 
(0.051) 
8.43 
(0.000) 
0.644 
(0.052) 
12.47 
(0.000) 
Wealth Index 0.629 
(0.018) 
34.28 
(0.000) 
1.113 
(0.018) 
61.20 
(0.000) 
Constant 6.397 
(0.127) 
50.20 
(0.000) 
4.436 
(0.128) 
34.66 
(0.000) 
-- -- -- -- -- 
R-Squared 0.057  0.134  
Observations 70, 868  70, 534  
Breusch-
Pagan 
(p-value) 
894.88 
(0.000) 
 1776.96 
(0.000) 
 
 
